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from Heiko Maas,  
Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs
Ever since humans have waged wars, warfare has been closely linked to technological development. 
Advances in chemistry led to the use of poison gas in World War I and claimed tens of thousands of 
lives. World War II ended with the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Both times, new 
technologies proved their effectiveness – in a dreadful, deadly way. Both times, the world reacted. In 
1925, countries agreed to prohibit the use of chemical weapons in warfare. After World War II, the 
world resolved to regulate the military use of nuclear technology. 
Today, we are facing a new frontier. In the digital age, technological progress is moving at lightning 
speed – with unprecedented and far-reaching impacts on the present, but also on future conflicts and 
warfare. Repeating the mistakes of the past could prove disastrous for humankind. We need to think 
ahead and we must start thinking now.  
Will we be able to trust autonomous weapons systems to select and attack targets without human 
involvement? How can we defend our energy supply against the malicious use of cyber instruments? 
Will revolutionary advances in gene editing and synthetic biology make it easier and more attractive 
for terrorists or states to weaponise biological agents? Can we reduce the risks to strategic stability 
associated with new missile technology and missile proliferation? 
If we do not find answers to these questions, we risk opening Pandora’s Box. Technologically 
advanced weapons, operating in undefined grey zones, could further undermine existing international 
arms-control regimes. Once deployed, new military technologies would almost certainly trigger a 
global arms race – with uncontrollable consequences for human security.  
Message
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It is high time to capture technology and rethink arms control. At a conference in Berlin on 15 March, 
we want to launch an international dialogue aimed at improving how we understand and address 
the challenges posed by new and rapidly advancing technologies. This event will provide a forum 
for diplomats, military professionals, academics, civil society and the private sector to discuss policy 
responses that strengthen international law, global peace and stability. I am grateful that experts 
from leading research and policy institutes – the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique (FRS), the 
International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik – German 
Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) and the Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute (SIPRI) – are helping us to start our discussions with their articles in this conference reader.
This introductory overview identifi es the key challenges that this conference hopes to address – 
without anticipating conclusions that we should jointly identify in the course of our discussions. 
I am looking forward to productive discussions and an informed dialogue with you on 15 March. 
Welcome to Berlin! 
Yours,
Heiko Maas, 
Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs
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Cyber Instruments and International Security
The International Institute 
for Strategic Studies (IISS)
Marcus Willett
Cyber space is the realm of computer networks 
in which information is stored, shared, and 
communicated online.1 We use ‘the Internet’ 
as shorthand,2 but the term ‘cyber space’ also 
encompasses the people using the computers 
and the ways in which this new connectivity 
has altered society. It is a man-made, virtual 
world where new generations increasingly 
live out their lives – it is how they learn, play, 
shop, bank, develop friendships, and date. 
Cyber space started as merely a means of 
communication, spread into e-commerce and is now integral to the ‘critical national infrastructure’ of 
states – agriculture, food distribution, banking, health-care, transport, water and energy. 
Although predominantly a virtual domain, cyber space has a signifi cant physical underpinning – the 
computers that store data and the systems and infrastructure that allow that data to fl ow. This includes 
‘the Internet’ of networked computers, closed intranets (your internal departmental or company 
network), cellular technologies, fi bre-optic cables and communications satellites. This physical 
dimension busts the myth that cyber space is entirely stateless – the physical infrastructure and the 
humans using it are tied to geography, and cyber space is thus subject to notions like sovereignty, 
nationality and property. Its integration with all facets of personal and national life equally busts the 
myth that cyber space is purely a technical phenomenon that can be left to the technicians. 
Refl ecting its origins, contemporary governance of the Internet is dominated by a multistakeholder 
approach. It emphasises trust, open-mindedness and consensus, with cyber space considered 
incompatible with traditional international governance models. This model is now contested both 
by those states arguing that existing international law and governance can and should apply to cyber 
space, and by those states wishing to create new international governance and law to establish greater 
state ‘sovereignty’ over cyber space. 
In parallel, states and non-state actors, including individuals acting alone, have seized the opportunity 
to intervene in the code and infrastructure used in cyber space to mount cyber operations to create a 
physical or cognitive effect. 
NATO cyberwarfare interoperability exercise at JFTC training centre in Poland
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The Threat and Opportunity of Cyber Operations 
We have seen cyber criminals defrauding our national economies of large sums. We have argued about 
the methodology used to calculate the loss – but it is always a high number, somewhere in the region 
of 1-2% of GDP. This includes criminals impersonating governments online (to steal data or funds from 
tax returns, for example) or banks or other elements of the private sector. Such impersonation threatens 
the trust our citizens place in their online interactions with governments, financial services, and the like, 
and so threatens the success of our increasingly digital-dependent economies. There is a nexus between 
some of these cybercrime groups and various states. 
States have used cyber means to kick-start their own economic development by plundering the 
intellectual property and national innovation of other states. The bilateral cyber agreement between the 
US and China was an attempt to curb such commercial espionage. 
We have seen state-sponsored hackers using cyber operations to try to siphon money from the global 
banking system, for example to circumvent sanctions. As with other cyber operations, we have seen the 
initiating party lose control of its code, resulting in widespread infection of unintended targets (such as 
with the Wannacry infection of the UK’s National Health Service). 
We have seen well-publicised hack and leak and wider cyber disinformation operations targeting national 
elections and political parties. These can potentially undermine democratic processes and bring down 
governments, and generally undermine trust in the data and information governments and societies rely 
upon for daily operation. 
We also see states using cyber operations to threaten the critical national infrastructures (CNI) of 
nations around the world: their financial institutions, oil industries, nuclear-power plants, power grids 
and communications routers. In at least one case, we have seen states use cyber operations to impede 
another state’s capacity to produce nuclear-weapons material.  
The Iranian cyber operations against Saudi Aramco provide a good example of a state’s threatening another 
state’s CNI within its own region. Yet cyber operations allow states to impose their will on adversaries 
beyond their immediate physical region. For example, Iranian cyber operations have penetrated parts of 
the CNI of Western states. This ‘asymmetric’ dimension makes cyber operations attractive to regional 
powers whose other levers of national statecraft are weaker than those of a superpower. 
All of this has made nations consider carefully the cyber vulnerabilities in their CNI, especially their vital 
energy supply, financial services and core telecommunications. States have realised that exploitation of 
these vulnerabilities, whether deliberate or accidental, could cause widespread damage and panic.
Overall, there have been more than 200 acts popularly portrayed as state-on-state ‘cyber attacks’. Yet 
the word ‘attack’ poses a definitional problem. Most of these cyber operations have combined espionage, 
media influence, economic coercion and political intervention, deliberately calibrated below the legal 
threshold for an act of aggression that would justify an armed response, and therefore fall in the grey 
zone between peace and war. This ambiguity is enshrined in the doctrine of the main perpetrators. Why 
risk combat, when you can achieve strategic advantage by operating in the grey zone?
More positively, states have seized the opportunity to use cyber operations against the worst non-state 
actors, for example to combat international terrorists (notably the Islamic State, or ISIS) and to thwart 
major cyber criminality. Generally, those states with appreciable cyber capabilities are incorporating 
them into their military doctrines, plans and national security strategies, and appear to be expanding 
their investment in such capabilities and increasing the tempo of their cyber-related activities. As part of 
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this, some states are also developing cyber capabilities for military use before and during confl ict: cyber 
‘weapons’ that, as part of a military campaign, can disrupt an adversary’s energy supply, transport and 
logistics, or conventional (or even nuclear) weapons systems. 
The Growth of Cyber Security
The growing appreciation of the threat from cyber operations has produced increased investment 
by governments and the private sector in protecting and defending networks, data and information. 
This is ‘cyber security’: the technical and human means to detect, diagnose, stop and deter unwanted 
cyber operations. Technical means include the automatic monitoring of networks to detect intrusions, 
based on up-to-date intelligence on the technical nature, modus operandi and intent of any potential 
‘attack’. Anti-virus software can be used to block low-level attacks on individual devices and networks, 
for example. Some states are exploring more ‘active’ measures across their wider national networks, 
to move beyond merely detection and blocking to automatically disrupting and eliminating ‘attacks’. 
Cyber attack threat matrix 
Source: IISS based on US Defense Science Board
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Human means range from the sensible application of basic policies (like password settings and 
patching) to public attribution, démarches, and escalation (such escalation does not have to adopt 
cyber methods, but could for example be economic sanctions). The broad strategic objective is to deter 
a cyber adversary by demonstrating the strength of a nation’s defences and thus significantly altering 
that adversary’s cost/benefit calculation: deterrence by denial. 
The view commonly held by the cyber security community, however, is that good defensive measures 
can stop or deter roughly 90% of ‘attacks’, but not all of them.3  The most sophisticated attacks, those 
prioritised and resourced by a highly cyber-capable state, can still get through. One result is that 
the conversation has evolved from attempting to secure everything fully to mitigating the risks of 
a successful ‘attack’, with an effort across the private and public sectors to establish effective plans 
for measures variously labelled as ‘disaster recovery’, ‘digital resilience’ and ‘business continuity’. Yet 
equally important is the effort to understand the true nature of cyber power and how dangerous 
it might be: to test whether we need different forms of deterrence, new norms of behaviour, arms 
control-like agreements and verification, and new methods of controlling the proliferation of cyber 
capabilities. Otherwise, we are simply resigned to living through an ever-escalating and increasingly 
expensive arms race between offence and defence. 
The Complications of Assessing State Cyber Power 
Without attempting to be exhaustive, here are three factors that complicate the task of assessing the 
true nature of a state’s cyber power. 
Firstly, a nation’s offensive (including military) cyber capabilities are largely undeclared, and most often 
designed to create confusion without detection, rather than obvious and attributable destruction. This 
is where the common analogy with nuclear deterrence starts to break down. Until states are more 
open about offensive capabilities or we conceive of these new capabilities in new ways, establishing an 
effective deterrence framework for cyber will be challenging. Today, however, the rapid speed of cyber 
technical development and innovation persuades the most capable states that they can develop and 
maintain an offensive advantage, providing little incentive for them to be more open. 
Secondly, some states outsource their cyber operations to non-state actors (or proxies). These include 
patriotic hackers, hacktivists, cyber militias, and cyber criminals. It is hard to distinguish when those 
non-state actors are acting for themselves or for a state.  Equally, states without an indigenous cyber 
capability can acquire it from non-state actors, or simply from the wild of the internet. Again, analogies 
with nuclear break down: the use of a sophisticated cyber ‘weapon’ effectively makes its design 
specification and modus operandi public and ripe for copying, as occurred with Stuxnet. 
Thirdly, the hardware and software of a state’s cyber capabilities are shared between its government, 
its private sector, and its citizens. The infrastructure is often provided, or owned, by the companies of 
another state, normally the US but with China’s market share increasing. A complicated interweaving of 
the public with private, the civilian with military, and the virtual with physical, makes cyber operational 
capability difficult to isolate and quantify. 
The difficulties inherent in any quantitative or qualitative measurement of state cyber capability in turn 
complicate how any monitoring regime might work in an international arms control-like agreement. 
Warships in the Antarctic can easily be detected, yet a piece of code inserted into a power plant is hard 
to detect and, even if detected, is hard to attribute definitively to an originator or an intent.
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What to Do? 
We need a more active international participation in the debate about the true nature of cyber power, 
as occurred with nuclear power 60 years ago. The questions we might ask are:
•  How dangerous are cyber instruments, really? 
•  How might deterrence work in the context of cyber? 
•  Do we need new arms control agreements and a non-proliferation regime?
•  Do we need increased and swifter public attribution? 
•  What are the norms of behaviour, the confi dence-building measures and the de-escalation 
channels? 
•  Can we develop practical incentives for states to adopt reasonable doctrines of restraint that 
respect the basic tenets of proportionality, necessity and distinction as enshrined in existing 
international law?
•  Can a shared interest in tackling cyber-crime bring states closer together? And can states be 
incentivised to take collective action against non-state actors?
We need to consider all of this with a proper understanding of rapidly-approaching technology: 
the ‘Internet of Things’ (including smart cities), artifi cial intelligence (AI) and quantum computing. 
Specifi cally, we need to factor into our understanding of a cyber arms race the advent of cyber 
operations enabled by AI and quantum computing: code that can learn to adapt to defensive measures 
and can deal with complexity beyond our current imagining. We need to account for the likely future 
shape of cyber space itself, and how ownership of its underpinning infrastructure might change from 
being predominantly US to predominantly Chinese and, looking further ahead, perhaps Indian. 
If we do not do all of this – get to grips with what cyber power really is and establish the right 
controls – a worst-case scenario might see even nuclear stability jeopardized. A combination of cyber 
and artifi cial intelligence has the potential to alter long-established deterrence norms, with states 
potentially unable to trust the integrity of both their Indications and Warning (I&W) information and 
their command chains. That would be the extreme version of what we already see today: that cyber 
operations have helped to erode trust in the online economy and in national democratic processes. 
This realisation is surely incentive enough for us to try to understand properly the implications of our 
century’s cyber revolution. 
Endnotes
1      This section draws on P.W. Singer and Allan Friedman, Cybersecurity and Cyberwar: What Everyone Needs to Know 
(Oxford, 2014).
2      We also see it described as ‘the digital environment’ and ‘the Web’. 
3      To illustrate the problem with the word ‘attack’: at one level, any government or company network is being ‘attacked’ hun-
dreds if not thousands of times a week. This is the routine ‘scraping’ and probing of networks by all sorts of actors, looking 
for ways in. 
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Weapon Systems with Autonomous Functions
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik – 
German Institute for International and 
Security Affairs (SWP)
Anja Dahlmann / Marcel Dickow / Lena Strauß
This chapter discusses weapon systems with autonomous 
functions (or lethal autonomous weapon systems, LAWS) 
in the context of arms control, especially with regard to 
the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW)1 
which has been the forum of international debate around 
LAWS since 2014.
Defi nitions, Terms, and Technicalities
The ICRC (International Committee of the Red Cross) 
defi nes autonomous weapons as “any weapon system 
with autonomy in its critical functions. That is, a weapon 
system that can select (i.e. search for or detect, identify, 
track, select) and attack (i.e. use force against, neutralize, 
damage or destroy) targets without human intervention.”2 
This defi nition shows two crucial factors. First, a system does not have to be completely autonomous 
but might only have autonomy in certain functions. Second, this notion of autonomy is interrelated to 
the human role in the targeting process. This broad defi nition would include existing weapon systems, 
for example air defence systems, therefore a regulation might need to include some caveats or the 
context of use.
Autonomous functions are enabled by a set of technologies: sensors, processors and software 
(computational methods) as well as actuators – accompanied by a power supply and a communication 
or command interface. Computational methods often referred to as artifi cial intelligence (AI) or 
machine learning are relevant software technologies. Those techniques entail neither a general 
intelligence nor the development of self-awareness or intention.
Although it is important to understand the technology and its capabilities that enable autonomous 
functions, the human-machine interaction is the more relevant subject for a regulation. The distinction 
between categories like automated, semi-autonomous, and fully autonomous systems is not 
particularly helpful for a regulation as it lacks a technological equivalent and distracts from the legal 
and ethical questions linked to the human-machine interaction.3 A way to address this interaction is 
the concept of human control, which the international debate about LAWS references in a number of 
different concepts such as human involvement4, human judgement5 or, most prominently, meaningful 
human control6.
Manned-unmanned teaming (MUM-T): The question of human control remains.
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Drivers and Opportunities of Autonomous Functions
Autonomous functions can be a military advantage as they can support the human operator where 
the technological capabilities outperform the human or where no communication link is available. 
Such tasks would be, for example, sorting of large amounts of data, fast reactions to incoming threats, 
so called dirty, dull, and dangerous tasks, or operations in secluded areas. Autonomous functions 
would also be necessary for hypersonic cruise missiles, under water or outer space operations, 
because communication links can hardly be maintained in these specific environments, e.g. during the 
hypersonic flight phases.
Autonomous functions in the targeting process might also be a way to protect civilian lives. One reason 
could be increased precision, although this is not a necessary consequence of autonomous functions. 
The second reason could be elimination of human emotions like fear, anger, and frustration that 
often lead to unnecessary violence or cruelty.7 One has to keep in mind, though, that compassion and 
common sense would be eliminated, too.8 Nevertheless, both aspects can be considered as beneficial 
ethical arguments from a consequentialist point of view.
Autonomous functions in the target selection and engagement could also be perceived as an asset 
for deterrence as those weapon systems offer a military advantage in certain scenarios. Furthermore, 
“human-out-of-the-loop arms are very effective in reinforcing a red line”9 which means that an 
automated retaliation would make threats and thresholds more credible.
Multidimensional Challenges from Autonomy in Weapon Systems
The opportunities described above entail various downsides from an operational, legal, ethical, and 
security perspective.
Operation
Militaries have several reasons to maintain human control over the use of force, one would be to avoid 
friendly fire resulting from inadequate or unpredictable machine decisions. Closely linked to this is 
the desire to achieve operational effectiveness, which is based on precision, predictability (from the 
system‘s action or its interaction with adversary LAWS), and lethal efficiency as well as the avoidance 
of conflict escalation due to increased speed.10 A slower (i.e. human) pace and human understanding 
could mitigate those effects.
Decision making in the targeting process is not just one action but has to be exercised multiple times 
within the targeting process. The military targeting cycle, for example the U.S. dynamic targeting cycle 
of find, fix, track, target, engage, and assess, can be a helpful tool for analysis.
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International Humanitarian Law
Weapon systems with autonomous functions must be able to follow the rules of international 
humanitarian law (IHL) in general and in the specifi c combat situation, especially the principles of 
distinction between civilians and combatants, military necessity, and proportionality of the attack. 
So far, machines cannot apply those abstract principles in dynamic situations, which calls for a close 
human involvement in the targeting process.
However, the necessity for human control over the use of force is not an explicit requirement of 
IHL. It is disputed whether the legal decision to implement those principles requires direct human 
involvement in general because the human (not just the state) is the relevant subject of law.11
An additional legal challenge is the accountability and responsibility in case of errors. Since the 
machine itself cannot be held accountable, a human must be linked to the fatal action. Several options 
are discussed, ranging from the product liability of the software developer to the accountability of the 
commander or operator. Especially the latter would require an understanding of the complex system 
and its possible interactions with the environment that even extensive testing and training might not 
provide.12
• Searching for targets that meet initial criteria in designated areas
• Identifying, locating, prioritizing and classifying of target
• Determining desired effect, developing targeting solution, getting approval to engage
  (including review collateral damage, ROE, Law of War, and the no strike list)
Fix
Find
Track
Target
Engage
Assess
• Continuous tracking of target
• Review the effects of the engagement
• Strike the target with determined and approved weapon
United States Dynamic Targeting Cycle 
(as in: iPRAW, Focus on Technology and Application of Autonomous Weapons, 2017)
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Ethics
In addition to legal challenges, severe ethical concerns arise from autonomous functions in the 
targeting process because they potentially violate the human dignity of the target. The ethical 
standard of human dignity has been established in various international treaties like the 1948 Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR), and the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).
Without human understanding in the targeting process the human target becomes one data point 
among many and therefore an object. If no one in the targeting process recognizes the human being, 
understands the value of human life, and is capable to reflect upon the reasons for taking this life, the 
targeting decision lacks moral agency and therefore violates the dignity of the human target.13
Security
A flip side of the potential for deterrence mentioned above is the danger of qualitative arms races 
stemming from the wish to outperform the adversary. In addition to that, the risk for proliferation is 
high: the technological components like sensors and processors as well as many software capabilities 
are developed in the commercial sector and are therefore available to non-state actors.14 One has to 
keep in mind that complex autonomous weapon systems are unlikely to spread as non-state actors 
lack know-how and infrastructure, but its underlying technology will spread eventually.15
Requirements for human control over the use of force 
(as in: iPRAW, Focus on the Human-Machine Relation in LAWS, 2018)
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Human Control as Subject of Regulation
The challenges listed above show a necessity for human control in the targeting process for operational, 
ethical, security, and – at least for the foreseeable future – legal reasons.
Minimum Requirements for Human Control in the Targeting Process
So far, human control in regulatory terms remains just as undefi ned as autonomy, but it is possible to 
derive a set of minimum requirements for human control in the targeting process. The International 
Panel on the Regulation of Autonomous Weapons (iPRAW)16 defi nes those requirements as situational 
understanding and options for intervention of a human in the design and use of a weapon system. 
To allow for human judgement and predictability, a human operator has to understand the state of 
the system as well as its environment to allow for informed decisions over the use of force. “This can 
be achieved through frequent points of inquiry throughout the targeting cycle. In addition to this 
situational understanding, the human operator needs options to interact with the system. […] The need 
for situational understanding and intervention is not limited to one single weapon system, but should 
also refer to systems of multiple robots executing a mission, which is how these capabilities will be 
developed and fi elded.”17
The adequate expression of human control depends on the context of use. For example, a cluttered, 
fast changing environment might call for more human understanding than other situations. This 
distinction can be observed in existing air defense systems at sea and on land.18 A regulation of LAWS 
would not be preventive in the strict sense: if it addresses the human-machine relation and (a context-
dependent) human control instead of a specifi c technology, it might be necessary to revisit existing 
types of weapons like mines or C-RAM in the light of this new norm.
Regulatory Options to Codify the Norm of Human Control
As Human Rights Watch argues, the norm of a necessity of meaningful human control exists already 
implicit in existing arms control treaties, e.g. on anti-personnel mines.19 If the CCW States Parties decide 
to implement or strengthen human control in the targeting process as an international norm, several 
options would arise. The legally binding options range from a comprehensive ban to relying on weapon 
reviews based on Article 36 Additional Protocol (I) to the Geneva Conventions20. This could be prepared, 
accompanied or replaced by soft law measures like a political declaration or a code of conduct.21
A legally binding regulation in the form of a CCW protocol could
a) set a positive obligation to safeguard human control in the use of force,
b) be a comprehensive ban on the development and use of weapon systems that lack human control 
in the targeting process, or
c) ban only the use of such systems (during international armed confl icts), 
but allow for development, stockpiling, and probably domestic use.
All three options would address the legal and ethical challenges discussed above, a comprehensive ban 
might also address security concerns like proliferation and arms dynamics.22
One impediment to a (legally binding) regulation could be the diffi culty of legally verifying the complex 
software capabilities that enable the autonomous functions. “Autonomy” cannot be observed from the 
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outside – and even if a system has built-in options for human supervision and remote control, one can 
hardly safeguard the actual use of those options, because the necessary software could be tempered with 
after the operation. So far, hardly any solutions for a verification regime have been discussed publicly.23
A first step to address the issue of verification could be a common understanding of the implementation 
of human control. This could be achieved by a (legally) non-binding document. Such a political 
declaration could acknowledge human 
control as a guiding principle, set minimum 
requirements for the implementation of human 
control, discuss best practices on that regard 
and set up further dialogue between States 
Parties. While for some States Parties such a 
political document might work as a basis for 
further negotiations towards a legally binding 
regulation, others might see it as the final step.
An addition to those regulatory tools – or a fall 
back option if States Parties cannot agree on 
anything – are weapon reviews according to 
Article 36 Additional Protocol (I) to the Geneva 
Conventions. Those reviews oblige the States 
Parties to ensure the use of weapons, means or 
methods of warfare are lawful prior to making 
new systems operational, therefore leaving this 
assessment to the individual state.
 
“Article 36 is necessary but not sufficient: First of all, it is not applied universally, as very few states 
have such a process in place. Second, it requires only a determination that weapons do not violate 
IHL (and possibly international human rights law) in general, a fairly low threshold to meet since 
just one IHL conform application is sufficient. Given the increasing innovation of weapons systems, 
it may become more and more difficult for a commander to understand how a system works and 
evaluate whether it will be lawful to use it in a given situation absent a supplemental review or 
process.
Moreover, the testing and evaluation of systems with computational methods is costly and presents 
several other challenges, which may translate to reviews which include incomplete information or 
cannot quantify the reliability of the system. Nonetheless, Article 36 reviews remain important, and with 
additional processes or guidance such as that recommended by Boulanin/Verbruggen (2017)24, could 
make the review more robust and increase the likelihood of compliance with international law. The 
challenge however is to universalize the practice of weapons review and make it more transparent.”25 
If the CCW States Parties do not find common ground within a reasonable time frame, a development 
similar to the bans on anti-personnel mines and cluster munition becomes quite likely: a group of like-
minded parties might move this issue from the CCW to another forum, possibly independent from the 
United Nations. On the one hand, this group could push the norm of human control by creating a concrete 
regulation. On the other hand, such an agreement would probably not include those states at the forefront 
of LAWS development and therefore would not stop proliferation and arms dynamics.
In conclusion, a regulation of weapon systems with autonomous functions is necessary and should focus on 
the norm of human control, which might even create a new principle of IHL. 
Mock-up of IAI Harop UAV – a drone with autonomous targeting functions
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New Developments in Biotechnology
Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute (SIPRI)
Kolja Brockmann / Sibylle Bauer / 
Vincent Boulanin / Filippa Lentzos 
Biological weapons present a serious threat 
to humanity and have been proscribed by 
the international community.1 However, rapid 
advances in biotechnology and in other emerging 
technologies could facilitate the acquisition of 
biological weapons and thereby raise challenges 
for international and national efforts to prevent 
their spread and use. Scientifi c advances, in 
particular the expanding toolbox to modify 
genes and organisms, are arguably making the 
development, production and delivery of biological weapons faster, easier and cheaper. There is now 
easier access to the knowledge, tools and components for creating living organisms, and amateurs and 
other new actors are entering the biosciences. Indeed, the Secretary-General of the United Nations 
warned in his new disarmament agenda about “the ability of new technologies to ease barriers to the 
access and use of prohibited weapons”, citing the examples of synthetic biology and gene editing.2 The 
biosciences have been characterised by substantial and sustained investment, but once discoveries are 
made, they become reproducible almost immediately and at minimal cost. The intersection of modern 
biotechnology with emerging technologies such as additive manufacturing, artifi cial intelligence (AI), 
nanotechnology and robotics adds further challenges. While these developments hold signifi cant 
promise of benefi t to society — including potential biosecurity benefi ts in terms of supporting 
surveillance, detection, prevention and responses to pathogens that present biosecurity risks — they 
also raise signifi cant concerns. 
The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), which has been in force since 1975, bans the 
development, production and stockpiling of biological and toxin weapons. Today, no state is offi cially 
accused of having a biological weapons programme. Nonetheless, suspicions over the activities of some 
states persist, and there are concerns about increasing national capacities to threaten or perpetrate a 
biological attack. The existing governance architecture around the BTWC is limited in its ability to 
completely and comprehensively tackle ever-shifting technological trends and their implications for 
security. Global biological arms control therefore needs to be re-envisioned and strengthened.
The State of the Art
Technological developments in both biotechnology and related emerging technologies can facilitate 
steps in the development or production of biological weapons and their delivery systems. Many of 
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these technologies enable the automation of specific operations that previously required manual 
manipulation or analysis by a human. In this way, they have reduced the scientific and engineering 
knowledge that is required for specific steps in the development or production of a biological weapon 
or they have made this knowledge more attainable to a wider range of actors. 
For example, developments in biotechnology are now making it possible to create entirely novel 
biological weapons by (1) making existing pathogens more dangerous (2) synthetically creating known 
or extinct pathogens, or entirely new pathogens (3) modifying the immune system, nervous system, 
genome or microbiome, and (4) delivering pathogens by novel means. Developments in bioscience 
also mean: that it is easier to misuse the science for a larger group of people, that vulnerabilities are 
becoming greater, that there is an expanding grey area between permitted defensive activities and 
banned offensive activities, and that it is becoming harder to detect and attribute bioweapons use. 
There is also new misuse potential arising from bioscience’s interface with other emerging technologies. 
For instance, AI could be used to optimize mutation of agents to increase their transmissibility or 
virulence. So-called cloud laboratories — completely robotized laboratories that can be hired to 
execute experiments on demand — could be used to automate certain laboratory tasks and thereby 
reduce the need for facilities and trained laboratory staff. Additive manufacturing, often referred to 
as 3D printing, can make it easier to produce and adapt delivery vehicles, such as unmanned aerial 
vehicles, commonly referred to as drones.
Fortunately, certain steps in the development and production of biological weapons, require not 
just enabling technologies but also practical experience, know-how and skills to execute a particular 
task. These in turn rely on hands-on training, sensory cues and apprenticeship — together, these are 
known as tacit knowledge. This requirement continues to present a barrier to acquisition of biological 
weapons by actors with limited resources or a lack of personnel who possess such tacit knowledge. 
Biological weapon development process: 
Possible enabling technologies
Source: Vincent Boulanin/Kolja Brockmann
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However, more and more development and production steps can be simplifi ed by automation and 
further technological advances could decisively increase the ability of states and non-state actors, 
including amateurs, scientists, criminals or terrorists, to acquire biological weapons. It is thus 
important to consider the range of actors in combination with the spectrum of required technological 
sophistication in order to understand and address resulting risks.
The process of making complex technologies accessible to wider audiences is often referred to as 
the democratization of technology. Today the science community benefi ts at an unprecedented scale 
from the ability to communicate and collaborate internationally. As a result, new knowledge hubs have 
emerged, virtual communities enable research collaboration across diverse locations and an increasing 
number of actors are using advanced technologies. This trend also enables states, non-state actors and 
individuals or groups to more easily access potential weapon-related technologies and exploit them 
for their own purposes. 
In the case of biotechnology, this increased accessibility expands the range of actors needing to be 
involved in discussions on biosecurity. On the one hand, this creates a new set of actors that regulators 
need to consider as possible perpetrators when taking steps to prevent the development of biological 
weapons. On the other hand, it also means that the range of actors that are stakeholders when it 
comes to regulation and compliance has considerably grown.
The development of biotechnologies is mainly driven by the civilian and private sectors and is therefore 
beyond direct governmental control. Governments continue to try to exert some oversight and control 
over the misuse potential of these technologies. However, they no longer have the infl uence that 
they previously held. This challenge is further complicated by the fact that these technologies are 
increasingly digitized and can thus be easily transferred or shared using email, electronic fi le transfers or 
cloud computing. This means, for instance, that traditional export licensing and customs controls may 
no longer pose suffi cient barriers. The digital forensics and audit capabilities that could complement 
them are rare or often inadequate in national authorities. 
Rapid developments in biotechnology and other emerging fi elds and the capacities they enable 
yield a multitude of opportunities (e.g. biological forensics) as well as risks, including novel military 
applications.
The Resulting Challenges for Biological Arms Control
The risks and opportunities arising from these technological advances are wide and varied. They could, 
for example, enable more targeted delivery of biological weapons. Recent advances in nanotechnology 
and robotics promise to create new ways to target cancer treatment using nanorobots. But the same 
technology might in the future be misused as delivery system for biological weapons that could 
potentially defeat known medical countermeasures. 
As biotechnology and related emerging technologies are increasingly digitized, they become more 
vulnerable to cyberattacks. Robots in laboratories reduce the need for trained laboratory staff, while 
permitting major productivity gain in the design-build-test cycle of biological systems. However, this 
also means that their systems or the data that they require could be stolen, misused or manipulated, 
including for activities that could facilitate the development, production or delivery of biological 
weapons or cause critical malfunctions in related equipment. 
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Several of the abovementioned trends and developments challenge the international biological arms 
control framework. The existing governance instruments exhibit a number of shortcomings that limit 
their ability to comprehensively and effectively review innovation in biotechnology and other areas of 
science and technology and address the consequent risks. For the policy discussion at the international 
level to keep up with current trends, regular and effective science and technology reviews are necessary 
to adequately assess developments and to involve key actors in industry, the research community and 
also the do-it-yourself (DIY) community in a more structured way.
Governance institutions and frameworks, including the states involved in their discussions and decision-
making processes, also struggle to develop a sufficient understanding of emerging technologies, the 
associated risks, and the potential impact on the activities, transfers or behaviour that they govern. It 
is therefore a significant challenge to allocate appropriate resources, leverage institutional linkages, 
develop novel instruments within existing structures or identify the need for, let alone establish, 
entirely new governance mechanisms.
In addition to increasing the understanding of ongoing developments in science and technology, 
existing treaty frameworks, organizations and governments need to raise awareness among a growing 
number of actors. These frameworks should 
further develop measures to address issues 
that they themselves may have only just started 
to consider in the biosecurity context. For 
example, establishing standards for genomic 
data security and privacy would be critical to 
reducing the risk of misuse of data for biological 
weapon development. However, companies 
and governments involved in genomic data 
collection and analysis have barely started 
considering this issue for personal data 
protection, let alone biosecurity. 
Forward-thinking work should consider the 
types of threat scenarios that are raised by 
such developments, so that both practical 
and regulatory challenges can be mapped out 
sufficiently. This could improve understanding 
of the direction of developments in science 
and technology — and enable timely policy 
responses.
It is important to keep in mind that technological developments also provide positive new 
opportunities for global health and numerous other areas, including for biological arms control and 
managing health crises and disease outbreaks. The data processing capabilities of AI, for instance, 
could help the national authorities in charge of preventing and managing biological incidents — 
intentional or natural — to gain better situational awareness and increase their ability to make informed 
decisions in critical situations. A number of new robotic applications — such as ‘laboratories on a chip’ — 
could speed up the detection of biological incidents by, for instance, enabling point-of-care medical 
diagnostics. Similarly, additive manufacturing may offer increased adaptability and enhance logistics 
by enabling on-the-spot manufacturing in disaster or crisis-response situations. New regulation 
or governance measures thus need to strike a balance that does not impair the ability to enhance 
biosecurity in innovative ways and does not affect industry disproportionately.
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The existing arms control and non-proliferation instruments either cannot explore connections 
between biotechnology and other emerging technologies or have not fully used their potential to do 
so. Several governance frameworks — in particular the BTWC and the Australia Group, the multilateral 
export control regime for biological and chemical weapons — capture, or are designed to adapt to, 
developments in science and technology. However, their different mandates and political differences in 
consensus bodies affect their ability to review and ensure adequate coverage of relevant technologies. 
The existing treaties and other governance instruments typically interact and cooperate with each 
other much less than the respective technologies that they cover. One of the overarching questions 
when viewing governance in the fi eld of biological arms control through the lens of technological 
development and convergence is therefore how to connect the relevant governance mechanisms 
despite their different membership and priorities. For example, Article X of the BTWC commits the 
states parties to facilitate the exchange of materials, equipment and technology for peaceful uses 
of biological agents and toxins, while the Australia Group with reference to Article III of the BTWC 
simultaneously promotes restrictions on the trade in agents, materials, equipment and technology 
that could be used in a biological or chemical weapon programme. 
Improvements to governance instruments need to address the structural factors and characteristics of 
new technologies and will have to be supported by a range of complementary measures. In particular, 
these could include the strengthening and spreading of soft governance measures such as codes of 
conduct, education and outreach. These efforts, in particular those that are bottom-up and involve the 
next generation of scientists and engineers, need to transcend the artifi cial divisions of the traditional 
scientifi c communities.
Most biotechnologies and other emerging technologies with misuse potential are no longer developed 
through dedicated state-controlled programmes, but instead in a competitive commercial environment. 
It is therefore indispensable to not only maintain and strengthen norms in research and state contexts, 
but to broaden and build more inclusive approaches. Norm-building in the private sector and in less 
formalized contexts, such as the DIY community, forms a major component of such efforts. 
Policy Options
In order to address the challenges posed by new developments in biotechnology, the international 
biological arms control architecture needs to be re-envisioned and strengthened. This requires the 
continuous reinforcement of the norm against biological weapons, the adaptation of existing national 
and international biosecurity and arms control instruments to the pace, impact and interaction of 
technological developments, as well as additional layers of governance. These efforts should further 
address the widened range of actors, including international and regional organizations, national 
governments, industry, research and academia, and the DIY community. In particular, they should 
improve these actors’ shared understanding of the impact of technological developments and foster 
multi-stakeholder initiatives. A comprehensive set of measures will require a combination of top-
down and bottom-up measures for governance and engagement.
Within the BTWC, stakeholder involvement could be increased and the states parties could create 
a permanent scientifi c advisory and review mechanism. This would provide review and analysis of 
relevant technological developments and enable a continuous exchange at the technical level to 
inform discussions and decisions within the treaty regime. Such a body would also be well placed to 
strengthen institutional linkages between different governance instruments, particularly at the technical 
3 0
2 0 1 9   C A P T 8 R I N *  T E C H N 2 L 2 * <   R E T H I N . I N *  A R M S  C 2 N T R 2 L 
C 2 N F E R E N C E  R E A D E R
level. A new mechanism for building trust and managing perceptions of intent in biodefence could 
be developed. Initiatives addressing increasing digitization and automation in relevant technologies, 
such as international standards on cybersecurity and customer screening for companies that provide 
laboratory or gene synthesis services, could also be introduced or strengthened.
At the national level, authorities could more systematically monitor developments in biotechnology 
and related emerging technologies. Inter-agency review and exchange mechanisms could 
strengthen linkages between authorities and provide more comprehensive and inclusive analysis of the 
implications of such developments. Parliamentary technology assessment mechanisms could focus on 
connections between technologies and resulting security implications, to provide policymakers with 
more accessible information on the current risk landscape. 
National authorities could also map the diverse field of relevant stakeholders working with technologies 
of potential concern. This would facilitate targeted outreach and engagement and simultaneously 
reap benefits from better mutual understanding between these stakeholders and the authorities. 
Governments could increase resources and expertise in export licensing and enforcement authorities 
to strengthen technology transfer controls and support research into strengthening the detection, 
prevention, response and attribution of incidents involving biological agents.
The private sector — and companies in the biotechnology industry in particular — continuously need 
to align self-regulatory measures and compliance standards with the evolving risk landscape. For 
example, companies that sell automated laboratory services could improve the screening of orders 
and customers by creating common databases of legitimate, trusted customers. They could also work 
together to identify cyber- and physical security standards that would limit the risks related to 
sabotage of cloud laboratories or misuse of commercial drones for malicious purposes.
Equally important are measures within academia and research institutions to incorporate consideration 
of biological weapon-related risks into research, funding and education at an early stage. This 
would increase awareness and internalize the norm against biological weapons. Further steps in 
this direction could include increased interdisciplinary cooperation on technology assessments and 
between national academies of sciences on codes of conduct, as well as the integration of courses on 
research ethics, biosafety, international law and national regulations into natural science curriculums. 
To build awareness and foster inclusive dialogue with the usually informal DIY community, workshops 
for operators of community laboratories could allow for an exchange of best practices in oversight 
functions, discuss risks of biological terrorism and provide an avenue for informal engagement with 
authorities. To foster responsible science and biosecurity awareness, competitions and conferences 
could include topical segments on risks and best practices.
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Endnotes
1      This part of the conference reader draws on the fi ndings of the SIPRI Research Report ‘Biology Plus X: Governing the 
Convergence of Biology and Emerging Technologies’ by Kolja Brockmann, Sibylle Bauer and Vincent Boulanin. The full 
Research Report can be accessed at www.sipri.org/publications.
2      United Nations, Offi ce for Disarmament Affairs, ‘Securing our common future: An agenda for disarmament’, New York, 
2018, p. 52.
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Missile Technology and Challenges 
Arising from its Proliferation
Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique (FRS)
Stéphane Delory
Over the last ten years, missile technology appears to have evolved rapidly. This troublesome trend 
is characterized by the considerable transformation of proliferating countries’ missile forces such as 
Iran’s and North Korea’s, but also by the dissemination of advanced missile technology in industrialized 
countries neighbouring them, as well as by the development of deep strike conventional weapon 
systems in Russia, China or the US. It is thus associated with very different sets of technologies. 
Modernization of proliferating countries’ missiles forces relies on rather old technologies, while 
current acquisition programmes in industrialized countries essentially concern mature technologies, 
which have been mastered by more advanced military powers for years or even decades. Even so-
called “state of the art” technologies that are currently being developed in Russia, China or in the US 
are in fact not so new, their use in operational weapon systems being only enabled by the evolution 
in other technological fi elds, such as computation, miniaturized sub systems, materials, simulation as 
well as by their integration into more effi cient architectures. 
Consequently, the destabilizing effect of new technologies in the missile fi eld is not as clear as it seems 
and cannot be disconnected from the balance of power between states and the way they approach 
it. Typically, destabilizing effects of missile defence technology have been mitigated by means of 
agreements between powers but also through restraint. The end of the ABM Treaty was not motivated 
by the opposition between the US and Russia on strategic forces or missiles defence per se but rather 
by the absence of common ground between the US and proliferating countries developing strategic 
weapon systems. More generally, the US and USSR have been able to deal with emerging destabilizing 
technologies for decades through tacit agreements, formalized when necessary. 
By contrast, destabilizing effects of missile technology are much more signifi cant when used by a 
regional military power in order to correct an existing military asymmetry, in other words in order to 
give strategic reach and set up a fairer balance. In this context, the quest for a new military capability, 
generally focused on ballistic weapon systems, can hardly be restrained through an agreement, 
since such agreements are systematically perceived as a plot to curb military acquisition and not as a 
stabilizing framework. 
Up to now, the destabilizing effects of missile technology acquisition programmes by proliferating 
countries or regional military powers have been exacerbated by the almost systematic link existing 
between long range missile technologies, i.e. ballistic technologies, acquisition programmes and 
WMD programmes. This link is more tenuous today, given proliferating states are developing weapon 
systems that can effectively be coupled with nuclear devices but are also conceived as conventional 
strike weapon systems. This evolution is clearly correlated with technology, and notably with the 
dissemination of guidance technology that progressively gives the possibility for some proliferating 
states to develop more accurate missiles, even at long ranges. In parallel, industrialized emerging ballistic 
powers have access to guidance and navigation technologies authorizing the design and production 
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of accurate conventional weapon systems, fostering the risk of dissemination. This dissemination and 
the growing dichotomy between WMD and ballistic technology slowly but inevitably undermines 
the existing missile technology control regime (MTCR), through the emergence of non-controlled 
producers but also through specific demands and national developments of some of its members in 
need of conventional strike capabilities. 
Old Technologies, New Problems  
Liquid Propulsion
The more disturbing trend in proliferating states’ mastering of old technologies is clearly related to 
UDMH/NTO1 propulsion technology. The transition from the old Scud propulsion technology (AK-
27/kerosene) to UDMH/NTO and the emergence of an industrial base able to manufacture engines 
adapted to this kind of propellant give proliferating states the required technology to produce a broad 
array of intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBM) and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM)  as 
well as space launchers. Yet their ability to domestically produce all the components of such engines 
remains to be demonstrated and some critical components, such as turbopump or some elements of 
the combustion chamber, may still require transfers from outside. In the mid-term, a major axis of 
technology acquisition is likely to use space cooperation in order to get advanced industrial tools to 
produce more efficient propulsion components. Proliferation of these technologies from proliferating 
states to countries wishing to develop ballistic capabilities through space programmes is a serious 
threat.  
Solid Propulsion
Composite solid propellant (essentially ammonium perchlorate-based) production used to be severely 
controlled, notably through stringent controls on binders (HTPB2), with few countries producing them. 
The reduced number of producers, the strictness of controls as well as the inherent difficulties in the 
industrial production of large pains of propellant all explain the slow diffusion of these technologies, 
including in industrialized countries. Nonetheless, large diameter missiles such as the Iranian Sejjil or 
the North Korean KN-11 demonstrate that a slow dissemination towards proliferating countries is 
taking place. Yet, industrial challenges appear to remain substantial, as illustrated by the cessation of 
Sejjil test launches for more than eight years now. More disturbing, medium diameter solid propellant 
missiles are more widely produced by industrialized countries such as Turkey, South Korea, Brazil, 
thus increasing the risk of dissemination through sales on international markets and international 
cooperation. As shown by the cooperation between China and Turkey, the MTCR does not prevent the 
dissemination of technologies, the initial capacity of the acquiring state being built through acquisition 
of weapon systems that are insufficiently covered by the MTCR (notably heavy rockets and very short 
range SRBM). Violations of MTCR guidelines on industrial tools also seem to be quite frequent, due 
to the lack of interest some of its members display towards controlling dual-use industrial equipment 
and tools.  
3 5
B E R L I N ,  1 5  M A R C H  2 0 1 9
Airframe and Case 
Another disturbing trend is the growing acquisition by proliferating states of industrial capabilities 
in the production of alloy, high-strength steel and composite materials. For instance, a systematic 
reduction of structural weight of the Iranian medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBM), for instance, the 
main evolution from Shahab-3 to Ghadr, through the use of alloy as well as through the use of alloy 
as well as  composite fi bres (on new Fateh models) can be observed. This industrial development will 
lead to the production of lighter casing, tanks and structures but also to more effi cient engines (for 
liquid propulsion) and nozzles. Combined with the production of more effi cient propellants, this set of 
modernization will give proliferating countries the ability to produce increasingly reliable long-range 
weapons systems. 
New Technology, New Problems
The use of new technologies is essentially related to navigation and guidance, but also to computing 
and simulation. The most obvious transformation is related to the systematic use of the Global 
Positioning System (GPS) for positioning missiles before the launch and correct their trajectory 
during their powered phase of fl ight. GPS is also used to address inertial measurement unit drift during 
the ballistic fl ight or during the atmospheric fl ight (for quasi-ballistic missiles). GPS compensates 
the defi ciencies of proliferating countries but also that of emerging ballistic military powers in the 
conception of modern inertial measurement units (IMU). 
The use of GPS to correct the powered fl ight of a ballistic missile is nonetheless limited and only 
marginally increases accuracy (20 to 30%) for crude ballistic missiles. Better performance will be 
achieved with modern ballistic missiles, notably with improved steering actuators and stage separation 
mechanisms. For modern systems, an increase in accuracy of about 70% can be expected. 
Low circular error probability (CEP) can only be attained through the use of terminal guidance systems, 
usually based on optical or radar devices for image correlation. These systems are already widely used 
for heavy rockets and short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM) fl ying on quasi-ballistic trajectories. When 
coupled with a GPS, a metric CEP can be expected. Missiles relying on IMU and terminal guidance tend 
to be less accurate, but a CEP between 30 and 50 meters is achievable. 
On longer range (800 km and more), high accuracy requires the use of separate manoeuvring warheads, 
which are guided during the re-entry by terminal guidance devices. 
Manoeuvring warheads are widely used by China for short, medium and intermediate range missiles 
dedicated to conducting conventional strikes. Due to the INF Treaty, Russia and the US did not 
developed operational systems for conventional strike. Up to 2015 (fi rst test launch of the Iranian 
Emad), manoeuvring technologies were considered as state of the art technologies. Until then, 
it was supposed that shaping the warhead, coupling a terminal guidance device and piloting the 
warhead within the atmosphere required considerable knowledge on re-entry and terminal guidance 
technologies as well as complex simulation tools, unreachable for most missile producers. 
With the production of Emad, which is a manoeuvring warhead tipped on a Shahab-3 or a Ghadr 
(i.e. a 1,500 to 2,500 km MaRV3 ballistic missile), Iran has proven that proliferation and dissemination 
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of missile technologies have to be reconsidered. Indeed, Iran was able to produce very high-end 
weapon systems with very few recorded test launches and without apparent failure. This success 
induces that Iran has access to efficient simulation technologies but also that it may be able to use 
additive manufacturing for the production of some components. This assumption also raises the 
issues of the blueprint’s origin and, more generally, that of intangible transfers of technology. Similar 
questions apply to other programs, notably to North Korea‘s where the conception of the KN-11 and 
its derivative remains unexplained. 
New Technology, New Proliferation
In fact, Iran (and, to a lesser extent, North Korea) is currently showing the path for numerous countries 
eager to develop a national missile capability. Emad’s case is an archetype but numerous other 
programs show that the old dynamic of proliferation is changing rapidly, setting new parameters. One 
should consider the steady development of the Fateh-110 which was in the early 2000s a modernized 
inaccurate heavy rocket with a range of 150 km but is now a very effective guided quasi-ballistic missile 
and as such the backbone of a new family of long-range systems able to strike with fairly high accuracy 
at more than 600 km. Current development of Iranian long-range cruise missiles is also of interest, 
due to the production of the turbofan which should be, in theory, well beyond Iranian industrial 
capabilities. The Korramshar raises also numerous questions, in particular how Iran is able to use a 
UDMH/NTO propulsion with few test launches and few failures.
New production technology will be used to modernize industrial tools used in the production of “old” 
and “mature” technology, especially the production of propellant, casings, subcomponents,  (notably 
electronic components), enabling higher reliability and enhanced performances. Extensive use of these 
means of production by industrialized countries will also dramatically decrease the cost of production, 
impacting national acquisitions and exports. Assessing to what extent such technology could enable 
the acquisition of production lines for ballistic and cruise missiles is of utmost interest. 
The problem of dissemination should not only be perceived through the threat of long-range, 
intermediate and intercontinental missiles but also through the prism of short- and medium-range 
systems, ballistic or not, easy to produce and market and which will become ordinary parts of military 
inventories. In this perspective, traditional instruments of control are still useful but potentially 
insufficient and should be completed by political instruments. 
Strengthening the Regulatory Framework 
Strengthening the Existing Non-Proliferation Framework 
The emergence of new technologies could be addressed in the existing MTCR and Wassenaar 
frameworks, first and foremost through the inclusion of new technologies and materials, and especially 
of new means of production, to the list of controlled goods. 
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Control of dual-use technologies could also be improved by strengthening the catch-all instrument. 
Inreach and outreach seminars could help countries to improve their use of catch-all. “Watch lists“, 
that is lists of non-controlled goods for which a special vigilance should be applied, could be shared 
between partners. These lists should take into account information and intelligence available regarding 
the trends of acquisition from proliferating countries. 
At the national level, countries should draw a more stringent defi nition of dual-use industrial 
equipment on national lists. 
Strengthening Confi dence and Transparency Building Measures 
The priority regarding the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCoC) should 
remain its universalization, through further outreach actions and a priority put in the adherence of 
major ballistic missiles producers, such as China. Nevertheless, it is worth considering enlarging the 
scope of HCoC to cruise missile technologies as well as more detailed transparency on technologies.
HCoC transparency measures should not be viewed as legitimizing the missile programmes of 
participant countries.
Exploring New Allays 
Other solutions could include the creation of a new multilateral framework on conventional missile 
technology dissemination; the publication of a new mandate for the 1540 Committee (its current 
mandate is due to expire on April 2021); contemplating how to increase the scope and effectiveness of 
the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). 
Although it is politically unrealistic to expect widespread support for any form of global missile regime 
or convention, it could be worthwhile considering the creation of an informal, time-bound process of 
meetings of a group of like-minded countries to consider ways and means to meet growing missile 
challenges.
Endnotes
1      Unsymmetrical dimethylhydrazine / Nitrogen tetroxide.
2      Hydroxyl-terminated polybutadiene.
3      Maneuverable reentry vehicle.
3 8
2 0 1 9   C A P T 8 R I N *  T E C H N 2 L 2 * <   R E T H I N . I N *  A R M S  C 2 N T R 2 L 
C 2 N F E R E N C E  R E A D E R
3 9
B E R L I N ,  1 5  M A R C H  2 0 1 9
Trends in Missile Technologies
The International Institute 
for Strategic Studies (IISS)
Douglas Barrie
Proliferation Trends
Advanced guided-weapons technology is 
now a prerequisite of a modern military 
inventory. From very short-range anti-air 
and anti-armour missiles, short, medium 
and long-range air-to-air and air-to-surface 
weapons, ballistic and cruise missiles, now 
form a central element of the most capable national militaries. The increasing adoption of such 
systems is in large part a function of their perceived military effectiveness. 
The US and its allies’ use of ‘precision’ guided-weapons during the wars of the 1990s and into this 
century impacted not only the states targeted but also China and Russia, and other states not well 
disposed to the US such as Iran and North Korea. Beijing and Moscow took away lessons on the kinds 
of missiles they needed to develop more rapidly, and to be able to defend against.
In the air domain the sale of combat aircraft is predicated on the associated weapons package. The 
aircraft per se is only part of the campaign. Also of signifi cance are the weapons on offer as part of any 
deal. As such a proposed weapons package, air-to-air and air-to-surface, can act as a discriminator in 
selecting a particular type of aircraft.
The perceived effi cacy of precision-guided weapons has had effects reaching beyond Beijing and 
Moscow.  Several other states with a mature defence industrial base have also either independently 
developed or pursued development of such weapons in concert with a partner nation, while a wider 
pool of nations have bought off the shelf.
Europe has since the 1990s developed three conventionally armed and one nuclear armed air-
launched cruise missiles: the Anglo-French SCALP EG/Storm Shadow, the German Taurus KEPD-350, 
the Turkish SOM, and the French ASMPA nuclear system. The fi rst three are subsonic designs, while 
the ASMPA has a cruise speed of around Mach 3. The SCALP EG/Storm Shadow and Taurus missiles 
have been exported to Europe, the Middle East, and in the case of Taurus to the Asia Pacifi c. The US 
AGM-158 JASSM air-launched cruise missile has been bought in Europe by Finland and Poland, with 
Australia an export customer in the Asia Pacifi c.
China and Russia have also exported cruise missiles in the Asia Pacifi c, but these have tended to be for 
the anti-ship role. Beijing and Moscow have also provided technical support for national developments 
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or for variants of systems already developed, such as the Indian Brahmos version of the Russian 3M55 
Onyx (SS-N-26). 
‘Precision’-guided weaponry also is no longer only a government domain. The spread to non-state 
actors may have begun with first and second-generation man-portable air defence missile systems 
and anti-armour guided weapons, but today some have been recipients of anti-ship and more capable 
anti-air missile systems. In at least one case a ground-launched land-attack cruise missile (LACM) 
appears to have been provided by a regime to a non-state group: the apparent use of an Iranian LACM 
by Houthi-led insurgents in the Yemen. In turn the Iranian cruise missile, the Soumar, is based broadly 
on the Russian Kh-55 (AS-15 Kent). At least a half-dozen of the latter missile were acquired illegally 
from Ukraine in the early 2000s. 
Technology Trends
Accuracy, range and speed are the design drivers for guided weaponry, whatever the class of system 
and the nature of the requirement. Taken together they contribute to the overall effectiveness of a 
missile in terms of lethality. And a consideration for the latter is also the survivability of the missile.
Subsonic to hypersonic cruise missile flight times
Source: IISS
4 1
B E R L I N ,  1 5  M A R C H  2 0 1 9
A high probability of reaching the target is required if only a small number of the weapon is to be used 
to engage. If a greater number is to be used then a lower probability for each round reaching the target 
can be accepted.
These three performance criteria exist in tension to one another, with missile designs trading off 
accuracy, range and speed depending on the requirement, type and size of warhead. Accuracy has 
traditionally benefi tted from a missile traveling at comparatively slow speed to provide the maximum 
amount of time for target acquisition or recognition depending on the type of terminal seeker or 
guidance package. Modest subsonic cruise speeds also helped to provide the maximum-range 
since the propulsion types adopted had comparatively modest fuel demands. Launching a weapon at 
extended range also reduced the risk to the launch platform. 
It was only in the early 1970s with the promise of increased accuracy that there began to be renewed 
interest in cruise missiles in the US. The nuclear-armed AGM-86B air-launched cruise missile entered 
service in December 1982, while the AGM-86C conventionally armed variant was used in the 1991 
war with Iraq. In parallel to the air force efforts, the navy funded development of the BGM-109 
Tomahawk, again initially as a nuclear-armed missile. The conventionally armed BGM-109C was, like 
the AGM-86C, fi rst used in Desert Storm in 1991. The ability to use a conventionally armed cruise 
missile was a function of greatly improved accuracy when compared to the systems of the 1950s. 
The use of conventional cruise missiles by the US further spurred interest in Europe. The Franco-
British SCALP EG /Storm Shadow and the German Taurus began development in the 1990s. Both use 
imaging infrared seekers for terminal guidance with inertial and satellite navigation used for mid-
course correction. The US AGM-158 JASSM uses the same guidance approach.
All three fl y at high subsonic speed, relying on a mix of signature management and fl ight profi le to 
reduce vulnerability. In an action-reaction model of weapons development, however, air defence 
designers have increasingly worked on both extending the range at which enemy launch platforms 
and cruise missiles can be detected and engaged. Russia and China continue to develop increasingly 
capable surface-to-air missile systems to provide layered coverage. The Russian S-400 Triumf (SA-21 
Growler) will, when the 40N6 missile enters service, have a maximum engagement range of up to 
400 kilometers against large radar-signature non-manoeuvring targets, such as a B-52H bomber. The 
SA-21 can use three different range classes of missiles to provide a layered defence.
Faced with increasingly capable air defences, cruise missile designers have once again looked to speed 
as means of defeat. Greater missile speed not only improves survivability, but for a given range will – 
depending on the Mach number – signifi cantly reduce the time taken to reach the target. Many of the 
systems cruise missiles are likely to be tasked to engage will either be mobile, and rapidly relocate, or 
time-critical. In the case of the latter this will include a window within which the missile needs to have 
arrived to have the desired effect: for example engaging a fi xed missile launch-site prior to weapon 
launch.
Franco-British research into a successor weapon family to the SCALP EG/Storm Shadow, known as 
the Future Cruise Anti-Ship Weapon, includes looking at supersonic and potentially hypersonic cruise 
speeds. Supersonic speed ranges from Mach 1 to Mach 5, with hypersonic speed from Mach 5 and 
above. The US meanwhile has a raft of high-speed missile projects underway from the solid-propellant 
AGM-183A Air-launched Rapid Response Weapon and the Hypersonic Conventional Strike Weapon 
to systems such as the Hypersonic Air-breathing Weapon Concept. China and Russia meanwhile are 
also working on high-speed glide vehicle (HGV) and cruise missile systems. Design drivers for these 
systems are the same as the US and its allies – the ability to improve weapon survivability in the face 
of improved surface-to-air missile systems, and to reduce the engage period for time-critical targets. 
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The ability to present air and missile defences with the challenge of handling ballistic, high-speed 
glide bodies and cruise missiles and subsonic missiles that operate respectively at exo-atmospheric 
to high-altitude (i.e. 30,000-50,000 meters) down to tens of meters for subsonic missiles is also a 
particular factor for China and Russia.
Speed, manoeuvrability and signature control (infrared, radar cross-section and electronic emissions) 
are all considerations in cruise missile design. While manoeuvrability is desirable, one challenge in a 
high-speed weapon is that the greater the velocity then the more stressing is any manoeuvre load on 
the airframe. This in turn demands a more robust airframe, which can increase weight, and a heavier 
airframe will reduce the range of the system, all other factors being equal. High-speed missiles will also 
have a greater infrared signature as a result of skin-friction heating, making them easier for an infrared 
sensor to spot. The trade-off to be considered on the part of the offensive weapon system designer 
is to accept a greater IR-signature assessing that the greater speed will more than compensate for 
the higher likelihood of detection at a greater range. Very-high cruise and terminal speeds confer 
their own kind of protection in getting inside the defenders engagement cycle. Furthermore, if missile 
accuracy is in the order of a few metres then at very high speed a warhead will no longer be required 
for certain classes of target. The weapon’s kinetic energy alone will have the desired effect.
Mach 5 and Beyond 
China, France, India, Japan, Russia, the USA and the United Kingdom all have expressed interest in very 
high-speed cruise systems and/or glide vehicles. Russia claims its Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle is 
now in production and will enter service in 2019. The glide body will initially use the UR-100NUTTH 
(SS-19 Stilletto) intercontinental ballistic missile until the successor Sarmat heavy ICBM enters the 
inventory in the early 2020s. China, meanwhile has tested what the US intelligence communities 
identifies as the WU-14, and is sometime referred to as the DF-ZF. Test flight of the Chinese HGV 
began no later than 2014, and like its Russian counterpart appears to be nearing service entry. The 
US is also considering HGV development to in part address its Conventional Prompt Global Strike 
ambitions, as well as looking at very-high speed missile systems. 
Russian very high-speed cruise missile systems include Tactical Missile Corporation’s GZUR 
(Hypersonic Guided Missile), now in development. This is reportedly a large air-launched Mach 6 land-
attack missile with a range of around 1500km. Also under development is the 3M22 Zircon high-speed 
anti-ship cruise missile. Again, this weapon has reported speed of around Mach 6. Both could enter 
service in the early 2020s. While hypersonic air-breathing propulsion is normally associated with the 
scramjet (supersonic ramjet), efficient ramjets may be capable of sustaining speeds of up to around 
Mach 6. The main difference between the two engines is that in a ramjet combustion occurs using 
subsonic airflow in a scramjet, the airflow is not slowed to subsonic speed and combustion needs to be 
supported at supersonic speed. While ramjet and scramjet engines are mechanically simple, the design 
demand of sustaining combustion in supersonic flow is considerable.
While China has developed a supersonic anti-ship cruise missile, the YJ-12, so far it has only shown 
and introduced into service subsonic land-attack cruise missiles. There is the possibility that, in terms 
of land-attack cruise missiles, Beijing may try to skip supersonic systems and instead aim to introduce 
Mach 5-plus weapons in the coming decade. 
Beijing and Moscow are also developing air-launched ballistic missiles. Russia’s Kinzhal, appears to 
be based on the 9M723 (SS-26 Stone) family of short-range ballistic missile. China meanwhile is 
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The Challenges of High-Speed Flight 
PROPULSION
• Propulsion confi gurations that are effi cient at high Mach numbers are not effi cient for low Mach 
numbers. A compromise in effi ciency or a hybrid system is required to operate across a wide fl ight 
envelope. 
• Hybrid engines or rocket boosters are a possibility, but they are mechanically complex – expensive 
and heavy. 
• Various propulsion options exist. As mentioned above, a combination of two may be the best 
answer:
  1. Rockets 
   a. Diffi culty in storing liquid propellant
   b. Very wide operating envelope including orbital velocities but not very effi cient at low
   speeds
   c. Throttling not possible in solid motors
  2. Ramjet – Uses the forward motion of the engine to compress incoming air before 
  combustion at subsonic speeds
   a. Very ineffi cient below Mach 1. Requires assistance to reach starting speed 
   b. Best operation between Mach 2 – 4. Ineffi cient outside of these limits unless optimised
   for a very specifi c combination of speed and altitude
   c. Very ineffi cient beyond Mach 6 due to shock-wave effects in the combustion chamber 
   d. Widely tested and proven
  3. Scramjet – Uses the forward motion of the engine to compress incoming air before 
  combustion at supersonic speeds
   a. Combustion takes place only at supersonic velocities
   b. Using hydrogen fuel and variable geometry, it can work between Mach 4 and Mach 15+
   c. Ineffi cient at orbital speeds. Imposes altitude constraints
   d. Largely untested – many developmental challenges remain 
GUIDANCE
• High speed effects limit guidance options
  o Electro-Optical and Radio Frequency seekers unable to operate through plasma generated  
  in front of the missile
  o Inertial systems inaccurate over long distances
  o Satellite-corrected guidance vulnerable to jamming / spoofi ng
  o Guidance relay on rear section liable to jamming 
AERODYNAMICS
• Effi cient aerodynamic lift-to-drag (L/D) confi gurations for high Mach numbers are not effi cient for 
low Mach numbers. A compromise in effi ciency is required 
• Thin structures are required to reduce drag, but they are harder to protect from thermal effects
• Shock boundary layer heating to extreme temperatures
  o LM test vehicle reached surface temperature of 2000 degrees Celsius
  o Aluminium and titanium are not suitable. Would have to use ceramics
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developing an air-launched ballistic missile designated the CH-AS-X-13 by the US Department of 
Defense. The missile is reportedly one of at least two air-launched ballistic missile programmes that 
China is pursuing. The CH-AS-X-13 has been associated with the anti-ship role, with aircraft carriers 
as the primary target. Russia’s Kinzhal appears intended to be capable of being used to engage naval 
and land targets.
In Asia-Pacific India and Japan both have hypersonic cruise missile research projects underway. Delhi’s 
Hypersonic Technology Demonstrator Vehicle (HSTDV) is aimed at exploring the technology required 
for very high-speed flight, and the so-called Brahmos 2 project with Russia has also been associated 
with a missile capable of Mach 5-plus. Japan’s budget request for 2019 also included funding into 
hypersonic cruise missile technology research. 
In Europe France is working on a successor to its ASMPA ramjet-powered nuclear-armed air-
launched cruise missile. Known as the ASN4G, a Mach 5-plus missile is a likely contender. 
Arms Control 
Strategic arms control developments have 
tended to reflect the wider political relations 
of the countries involved. Improvements 
in relations between the Soviet Union 
and the USA in the late 1960s and early 
1970s led to the Strategic Arms Limitation 
Talks (SALT I) and also the Anti-Ballistic Missile 
Treaty. The follow-on SALT II foundered 
as a result of the Soviet military intervention 
in Afghanistan. The Strategic Arms 
Reduction Treaty I (START I) was signed in 
1991, with START II inked in 1993. The Strategic 
Offensive Reduction Treaty (SORT) was agreed 
in 2002, to be followed by NEW START in 
2010. The last treaty covers the period to 2021.
The early 1970s SALT I placed a ceiling on 
the ICBM silos and submarine ballistic missile 
launch-cells. Warhead holdings were not addressed. By the time of the SORT agreement, the warhead 
issue had been addressed placing a cap of between 1,700 to 2,200 warheads on Russia and the USA, and 
the following New START covered both strategic nuclear warheads and ICBMs, SLBMs and ‘strategic’ 
bombers. Warhead numbers were capped at 1,550, and delivery systems at 700.
Ballistic rather than cruise missiles have quite rightly been central to strategic arms limitation efforts. 
Instead cruise technologies have been covered more in the US-Soviet 1987 Intermediate Nuclear 
Forces (INF) Treaty and in proliferation terms through the multi-lateral Missile Technology Control 
Regime, a non-binding consensus accord. Signed in December 1987, the INF came into effect in 
August 1988 and was a high point of Cold War arms control. It removed a whole class of ground-based 
ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500km-5,500km. The MTCR is intended to curtail 
the proliferation of ballistic and cruise missiles capable of delivering a weapon of mass destruction. 
Thresholds cover the ability to carry a 500kg payload greater than 300 kilometres. 
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Cruise missiles in an arms control context present in one sense at least a greater challenge than ICBMs 
in that since the 1980s they have been dual-capable. In an arms control context ICBMs and SLBMs 
are easier to manage in that they so far they have been nuclear-only delivery systems. Today there 
is no ambiguity in terms of payload if an ICBM or an SLBM launch is detected. The US AGM-86 and 
the BGM-109 both began as nuclear-delivery systems, but guidance-improvements provided levels 
of accuracy that offered operational utility when fi tted with a conventional warhead. Once Moscow 
was capable of the levels of accuracy required to use a conventionally-armed cruise missile at long-
range, then it also pursued this course. The air-launched Kh-101/102 (AS-23A/B Kodiak) uses the 
same missile design to meet both the conventional and nuclear tasks. Similarly the naval 3M14 (SS-N-
30A) cruise missile is inherently dual-capable. And it is a version of this weapon that Washington and 
its NATO allies claim Russia has deployed in breach of the INF Treaty, resulting in the US suspension 
of the agreement at the beginning of February 2019. Moscow maintains that the missile does not 
contravene the INF, though in response to the US suspension said it would develop a ground launched 
cruise missile (GLCM) based on the naval 3M14 during the course of 2019. 
Speed becomes a compounding factor in dealing with the potential payload ambiguity of cruise 
missiles, and, once they are introduced into service, high-speed glide vehicles. From the offensive 
perspective the reduced time to target is an advantage, shrinking the defender‘s response time to 
engage the missile or move the intended target if it is mobile. However, if there is any ambiguity 
surrounding the kind of payload the system is carrying then a worst-case analysis may well prevail. 
This is destabilizing if both combatants are nuclear-capable, and risks inadvertent crisis escalation if a 
misjudgement is made in terms of how a belligerent will respond, or concerning the kind of warhead 
involved in a hypersonic cruise missile or high-speed glide vehicle attack. Faced with a dual-capable 
missile launch in a crisis, there will be pressure on the military and potentially political decision chains 
to decide upon a response, with reduced time to consider options, and to factor in whether a nuclear 
rather than conventional payload is involved.
Neither the beleaguered INF nor the MTCR address directly the issues of dual capable high-speed 
cruise missiles or glide-bodies. Beyond this, moving to try to craft any form of agreement or treaty on 
the use of dual-capable supersonic cruise missile will likely be diffi cult, given the number of states that 
already operate such systems. Whether, however, there may be the possibility of managing the impact 
of hypersonic cruise missiles and glide vehicles may be worth exploring, given the risks. Removing 
ambiguity as to the kind of payload with which a hypersonic cruise missile or glide-body is fi tted by 
limiting such systems to either the conventional or nuclear-role would be inherently stabilizing. Such 
an approach would require intrusive verifi cation amongst the signatories, and would likely require that 
any agreement be multilateral rather than bilateral, given the number of countries already interested 
in such classes of weapons.
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